Month: September 2013

  • THE THEORY OF CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

    THE THEORY OF CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
    ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN
    by
    Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers)
    http://www3.cutr.usf.edu/security/documents%5CCPTED%5CTheory%20of%20CPTED.pdf

    The theory of crime prevention through environmental design is based on
    one simple idea — that crime results partly from the opportunities presented
    by physical environment. This being the case it should be possible to alter
    the physical environment so that crime is less likely to occur.
    Simple, almost obvious as this may be, the idea that crime is partly caused
    by physical environment has been a controversial one among criminologists.
    In my presentation I will argue that the controversy is based on a
    misunderstanding about causes and will review what is now a large body of
    evidence that the physical environment plays an important part in crime. I
    will then review current approaches to changing the physical environment
    and the “opportunity” theories on which these rest. I will also consider the
    main criticism of environmental crime prevention that it does not reduce
    crime, but merely displaces it to some other time, place or target. Finally, I
    will draw out the main lessons from research about successful ways to
    implement crime prevention through environmental design.
    Three approaches to crime prevention through environmental design
    There are three distinct approaches or theories that come under the general
    heading of “crime prevention through environmental design”. The term was
    coined by the criminologist, C. Ray Jeffery, who published a book in 1971
    arguing that sociologists had considerably overstated the social causes of
    crime, such as relative deprivation and subcultural influences, and had
    neglected both biological and environmental determinants. He went on to
    make the general argument that prevention ought to be focused on factors
    related to the biology of crime, such as exposure to lead which he thought
    caused brain damage and delinquency in children, and to reducing the
    environmental opportunities for crime.
    1His book met with either indifference or considerable hostility from
    criminologists, who were particularly offended by the biological arguments.
    The book contained few prescriptions for reducing opportunities, but his
    followers, in particular, Tim Crowe (1991), have now developed a
    comprehensive set of guidelines to reducing opportunities for crime in the
    built environment, intended to guide police, town planners and architects.
    These guidelines have been promulgated in hundreds of training sessions
    given by Crowe and others throughout the United States, and the approach is
    well known by its acronym, CPTED.
    The second approach falling under crime prevention through environmental
    design is the “defensible space” theory of the architect, Oscar Newman
    (1972), who published his famous critique of American public housing at
    about the same time as C Ray Jeffery’s book. Newman put much of the
    blame for the high crime rates of public housing “projects” on their lay-out
    and design. In particular, he criticized the huge, inhuman scale of the
    developments, their stark design that made it seem that no-one cared about
    them, their location in high crime neighborhoods, and the large buildings
    that made it difficult for residents to know who were other residents and who
    were intruders. These factors conspired to attract criminal predators who
    could commit their crimes with little fear of arrest. Newman, and some other
    enlightened architects such as Richard Gardiner, put forward a wide range of
    detailed design suggestions to change these conditions and make housing
    safer. The purpose of Newman’s suggestions was to encourage natural
    territorial behavior on the part of residents by enabling them to give
    surveillance to the public areas around their individual residences.
    His thesis was savagely criticized by criminologists and other social
    scientists, who accused him of “environmental determinism” and of making
    simplistic extrapolations to human behavior from the territorial behavior of
    animals. Nevertheless, Newman has had an enormous impact on the design
    of public housing in many parts of the world. The wholesale abandonment of
    tower block buildings for public housing owes much to his arguments about
    their criminogenic potential. In recent years, the federal government in the
    United States has once again begun to pay attention to Newman (Cisneros,
    1996), commissioning him to publish a restatement and defense of his views
    (Newman. 1996).
    The third environmental design approach is situational crime prevention,
    which was developed by the British government’s criminological research
    2department in the mid-1970’s (Mayhew et al., 1976; Clarke and Mayhew,
    1980). Unlike CPTED, and “defensible space”, this approach is not
    concerned principally with architectural design and the built environment.
    Nor is it focused mainly upon predatory offenses of robbery or burglary.
    Rather, it is a general approach to reducing the opportunities for any kind of
    crime, occurring in any kind of setting, including airline hijackings, welfare
    frauds, obscene phone calls, pub violence and domestic violence, as well as
    the conventional predatory offenses.
    Most of the research into the relationship between crime and environmental
    opportunities has been conducted under the rubric of situational crime
    prevention and most of the current “opportunity” theories that now underpin
    crime prevention through environmental design, and that have made this a
    respectable approach among a large and influential body of “environmental
    criminologists”, has been developed by researchers associated with
    situational crime prevention.
    So if crime prevention through environmental design is now more
    theoretically respectable, why was it rejected at first by criminologists and
    what has happened to change this state of affairs? I have already mentioned
    that Jeffery’s and Newman’s ideas did not accord with those held by most
    American criminologists. In America, criminology is principally an offshoot
    of sociology and, not surprisingly, social factors are generally held to be the
    most important in causation. Oscar Newman, was not even a social scientist,
    but an architect! He seemed not only to be ignorant of the findings of
    criminology, but had also made some basic statistical errors in his research.
    These criticisms, together with some disappointing results from early crime
    CPTED experiments made it easy for both Jeffery’s and Newman’s ideas to
    be ignored by academics. Even the US federal government lost interest in
    the ideas for a period of nearly fifteen years between the beginning of the
    1980s and the mid-1990s.
    Several developments took place during these years which have greatly
    changed the situation:
    1. much more evidence has accumulated of the important role of
    opportunity in crime;
    2. new criminological theories have been developed, including the rational
    choice approach and routine activity theory, which give a much greater
    role to environmental determinants of crime;
    33. a large number of case studies has been published showing substantial
    reductions in crime following environmental change;
    4. much less displacement of crime has been found as a result of
    environmental changes than critics claimed.
    The role of opportunity in crime
    I will review each of these developments in turn, beginning with the role of
    opportunity in crime which I will illustrate briefly with results from three
    important studies. The first is not a study of crime but of suicide. I mention it
    because, like many serious crimes, suicide is usually seen to be a deeply
    motivated act, only committed by very unhappy or disturbed people.
    However, a strong and surprising opportunity component appears in suicide
    trends in England and Wales during the 1960s and 1970s (Clarke and
    Mayhew, 1988).
    From the table (at the end of this article), you should be able to see that in
    1958 almost 50 percent of the nearly 5,300 people who killed themselves in
    England and Wales did so by domestic gas. This gas contained high levels of
    carbon monoxide and was very poisonous. People would kill themselves by
    putting their head in the gas oven or by lying down by the gas fire, having
    blocked up any gaps under doors or around windows.
    During the 1960s, domestic gas began to be manufactured from oil rather
    than from coal. As a result, it became less poisonous and the number of
    people killing themselves with gas began to decline. In 1968, manufactured
    gas began to be replaced by natural gas from the recently discovered North
    Sea fields. Natural gas is free of carbon monoxide and is almost impossible
    to use for suicide. By the mid-1970s when natural gas had been introduced
    throughout most of the country, less than one percent of suicides were by
    domestic gas, compared with about 50 percent at the beginning of the
    period.
    What is deeply surprising is that suicides did not displace wholesale to other
    methods. Between 1968 and 1975, total suicides dropped by about one third
    from nearly 5, 300 to nearly 3, 700. This was during a time of much
    economic uncertainty when one might have expected suicides to increase
    and, indeed, was generally increasing in other European countries.
    4Why did people not turn to other methods instead? Why did they not
    overdose on sleeping pills, shoot or hang themselves, jump out of high
    buildings, or put their heads on the railway tracks? The reason is that all
    these methods have disadvantages not possessed by gas. It is difficult to
    collect together enough pills to kill oneself and many people who take an
    overdose have their stomachs pumped and their lives saved. Few people
    have guns, and in any case these result in blood and disfigurement. Hanging
    oneself or jumping out of a tall building requires courage and resolution.
    Lethal domestic gas, on the other hand, used to be piped into most people’s
    homes, required little preparation and involved no pain. It is easy to
    understand why it was the favored method of suicide in Britain for so long.
    Nor is it so surprising that when the opportunity to use it was removed, the
    overall suicide rate declined.
    The second study concerns motorcycle theft in Germany during the 1980’s
    (Mayhew et al., 1989). You will see from the first column of the table that
    thefts of motorbikes had drastically declined from about 150,000 in 1980 to
    about 50,000 in 1986. If you who do not already know the reason, you will
    be most surprised to learn it. It was because in 1980 it was made illegal to
    ride a motorbike in Germany without a helmet. This meant that anyone
    stealing a motorcycle without a helmet would be readily spotted. The law
    was gradually enforced more strictly during the period and resulted in the
    large decline in motorcycle thefts. This suggest a much stronger
    opportunistic component in motorcycle theft than anyone would have
    thought.
    The second and third columns of the table show the totals for car and bike
    thefts during the same years. These provide some limited evidence of
    displacement because thefts of cars went up from about 64,000 to 70,000.
    Thefts of bicycles also increased between 1980 and 1983, but by the end of
    the period had declined again below the numbers for 1980. Altogether, it is
    clear that at best only a small proportion of the 100,000 motorbike thefts
    saved by the helmet laws were displaced to thefts of other vehicles.
    Again, a little thought shows why this may not be surprising. Motorbikes
    may be particularly attractive to steal. Young men who comprise most of the
    thieves find them much more fun to ride than bikes. Even if the intention is
    only to get home late at night, it is much easier to ride a motorbike for a few
    miles than a bicycle. Motorbikes may also be easier to steal than cars since
    the latter have to be broken into before they can be started.
    5The third study comes from the United States and concerns the dramatic
    increase in residential burglary during the 1960s and 1970s. A careful
    analysis by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson (1979) showed that this
    increase could readily be explained by a combination of two changes that
    had occurred in society during this period. Together these had greatly
    increased the temptation and opportunity for burglary. Temptation had been
    increased by the vast increase in light-weight electronic goods such as TV’s
    and VCR’s in people’s homes that could readily be sold. The opportunity to
    commit burglary was greatly increased as a result of far more women going
    out to work. This meant that far more homes were empty during the day and
    therefore unguarded. The combination of more attractive goods to steal and
    more unguarded homes easily accounted for the increase of burglary
    without having to assume any increase in the criminality of the population.
    Opportunity theories
    Studies like these have helped to bring about a change in criminological
    theorizing. In particular, it is now more widely recognized that most
    traditional criminological theories are really theories of criminality or
    delinquency and not theories of crime. Traditional theories deal in the
    factors that cause people or groups to be disposed to criminal action. In other
    words, they deal in behavioral tendencies, not behavior itself.
    The point can be clarified by revisiting a truism of psychology, which is that
    behavior is the product of the interaction between the person and the setting.
    To put this in the language of criminology is to say that crime (a behavior) is
    a product of the interaction between a criminal or delinquent propensity and
    a criminal opportunity. While it is necessary to understand the factors that
    result in criminal dispositions, this alone does not explain the occurrence of
    crime. To explain crime, one must also explain the interaction between
    disposition and opportunity. This is what most traditional criminology has
    failed to do. Instead, it has assumed that explaining criminal dispositions is
    the same as explaining crime.
    This error is now being corrected. Criminologists are beginning to take an
    interest in developing, not just theories of criminality or delinquency, but
    what are called “theories of crime” (or, sometimes, “opportunity” theories).
    The two best known of these are routine activity theory and the rational
    choice perspective. Though complimentary, these both deal with somewhat
    6different questions. Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) seeks
    to explain how changes in society in the numbers of “suitable targets” for
    crime, or in the numbers of “capable guardians” against crime results can
    lead to more or less crime. One example of the application of this theory is
    Cohen and Felson’s explanation, that I mentioned, for the increased burglary
    rate in the United States in the 1970s. This was due to the increase of
    “suitable targets” in homes (VCRs and TVs) and the decline of “capable
    guardians” (women no longer at home in the day).
    The rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) tries to
    understand crime from the perspective of the offender. It asks: What is the
    offender seeking by committing crime? How do offenders decide to commit
    particular crimes? How do they weigh the risks and rewards involved in
    these crimes? How do they set about committing them? If prevented from
    committing them, what other crimes might they choose to commit?
    It should be clear from these questions that the rational choice perspective is
    directly concerned with the thinking processes of offenders, how they
    evaluate criminal opportunities and why they decide to do one thing rather
    than another, Indeed, why they choose to obtain their ends by criminal and
    not legal means.
    This perspective has helped to explain why displacement does not always
    occur (think about the reasons I gave for suicides not switching to other
    methods and why motorcycle thieves did not begin to steal cars or bicycles).
    It has also been helpful in thinking about different ways to reduce
    opportunities for crime. Sixteen different ways to reduce opportunities for
    crime are described in situational crime prevention falling under four
    objectives, taken from the rational choice perspective. These are:
    1. to increase the perceived difficulty of crime;
    2. to increase the perceived risks of crime;
    3. to reduce the anticipated rewards of crime;
    4. to remove excuses for crime.
    More than eighty examples of success using these opportunity-reducing
    measures have been documented in careful research studies. Twenty three of
    these studies are reprinted in my book, “Situational crime prevention:
    Successful case studies” (Clarke, 1997), but I can only list a handful of these
    now. They are listed in the table under the four principal ways to reduce
    7opportunities for crime. You will see that some of these measures were
    devised here in Sweden.
    Displacement
    I have mentioned “success”, but what about displacement? The gas suicide
    and motorcycle theft examples have already shown that displacement is not
    inevitable. But what happened as the result of the measures that I listed in
    my table? For example, did the check forgers frustrated by the new check
    cashing rules in Sweden turn to some other kind of fraud or theft? Did the
    post office robbers thwarted by the anti-bandit screens in London begin to
    take customers hostage or attack the armored vehicles collecting money
    from the post offices? Were criminals shifted by the improved street lighting
    in the council housing estate in Dudley to another nearby estate where the
    lighting was not improved? And so forth.
    In truth, it is difficult to make definitive studies of all these possibilities, but
    many published evaluations include some investigation of displacement.
    Four years ago, Rene Hesseling (1994) reviewed the literature on
    displacement for the Dutch Ministry of Justice. He examined 55 studies in
    which displacement had been studied. What he found was very revealing. In
    22 of the studies, no evidence of displacement was found. In the remaining
    33 studies some evidence was found, but the displacement was often
    relatively small. In no case, did the crime displaced elsewhere equal the
    crime prevented.
    In addition, researchers are now beginning to find evidence of the reverse of
    displacement so that focused situational prevention projects have produced
    wider reductions in crime beyond the direct reach of the prevention
    measures. A clear example comes from a university campus in Southern
    England where CCTV cameras were introduced to monitor the car parks
    (Poyner, 1997). Car theft fell not only in the three car parks given
    surveillance by the cameras, but also in a fourth car park that the cameras
    could not monitor because the view was obstructed by buildings. It seems
    that potential car thieves were unsure about the coverage of the cameras and
    decided to avoid the university altogether. This phenomenon, whereby the
    preventive benefits spread more widely, has been called the “diffusion of
    benefits” and is now being found regularly in a variety of studies. It greatly
    enhances the appeal of crime prevention through environmental design.
    8Summary and recommendations
    Before concluding with some recommendations about applying crime
    prevention through environmental design, let me summarize my presentation
    so far. I have argued that the earlier claims made for crime prevention
    through environmental design were rejected by criminologists who felt that
    the physical environment plays a relatively unimportant part in crime
    causation. Much of this criticism was misplaced because criminologists had
    generally not recognized that their theories were mostly concerned with the
    development of criminal dispositions, not the occurrence of crime.
    Growing evidence about the role of opportunity in crime has encouraged the
    development of some new “opportunity” theories, including routine activity
    theory and the rational choice perspective. The latter in particular has
    provided the theoretical basis for situational crime prevention, which has
    now accumulated a solid record of crime reductions achieved in many
    different contexts. Displacement has not proved such a threat as once
    thought and there is growing evidence of diffusion of benefits from crime
    prevention projects.
    There is no doubt that crime prevention through environmental design will
    be increasingly be used to help protect society from crime. Indeed, it already
    is an integral part of crime control policy in several European countries. But
    what has been learned in the last 25 years about its application to town
    planning and architectural design, which is of particular interest to many of
    you at this meeting? Let me conclude with what I believe are the main
    lessons:
    1. Reducing access and enhancing territoriality and surveillance, as
    advocated by Oscar Newman, and in Tim Crowe’s more recent guidelines,
    represent a somewhat narrow crime prevention approach. A much wider
    range of opportunity-reducing techniques has been identified in recent
    situational crime prevention research.
    2. The image of the “predator from outside”, which underlies the original
    defensible space thesis (and Crowe’s guidelines), ignores the fact that much
    crime is committed by residents and other legitimate users of the space.
    Access controls and improved surveillance may be of limited value in
    preventing crime by residents.
    93. Opportunity-reducing measures appropriate to certain offenses may not be
    appropriate to others. This means that crime prevention through
    environmental design must be tailored to the specific problems occurring in
    particular settings. Standard packages of measures will not usually reduce
    crime significantly.
    4. In any setting, there are always choices to be made in the opportunityreducing measures to be implemented. These choices must consider the
    practicality and sustainability of the various options, their social
    acceptability and their economic costs. It is nearly always possible to
    identify practical, low cost, unobjectionable ways of reducing opportunities
    for crime.
    5. Numerous evaluations have shown that, by themselves, design changes
    can bring about only rather modest reductions in crime. If substantial
    reductions are to be achieved, design improvements usually have to be
    supported by changes in management or policing of the built environment.
    6. When crime prevention design changes are being made to existing
    environments, care must be taken to ensure that residents and other
    legitimate users are consulted in detail about the proposed improvements.
    Otherwise, changes might be resisted and prove impossible to implement as
    planned.
    So long as crime prevention through environmental design is applied
    carefully and intelligently, with due regard to these and other lessons of past
    practice, there is every reason to believe that it can achieve worthwhile
    reductions in crime, wherever it is employed.
    10

    http://www3.cutr.usf.edu/security/documents%5CCPTED%5CTheory%20of%20CPTED.pdf

  • Karen prayer centre.

    Prayer centre.
    Room size. 4mx 4m.
    Plot size.
    100m x 30m.

    Number of rooms per floor=50 rooms.
    Number of rooms for 3 levels=150 rooms.
    Cost of construction per m2. High class finishes =kes 35,000
    Cost of construction per room=kes 35,000 x 16m2=560,000
    Cost of construction per floor=kes 560,000 x50 rooms=kes 28,000,000
    Cost of construction per 3 floors=kes 84,000,000

    Bedsitter/1 bedroomed.
    Plot size 200m x 50m.

    Number of 1 bdrmed units per floor.40
    Size of I bedr. unit=6m x 5m=30m2
    Cost of 1 bedr. unit=30m2x kes 35,000 per m2=kes 1,050,000
    Cost for 40 units=kes 42m.

    Rent per unit=kes 15,000
    Rent for 40 units per year=kes 15,000 x 40 units x 12 months=kes 7.2m
    Return on Investment=kes42m/7.2m=5.8 years.

    Number of bedsitter units per floor.40
    Size of bedsitter unit=4m x 5m=20m2
    Cost of bedsitter unit=20m2x kes 35,000 per m2=kes 700,000
    Cost for 40 units=kes 28m.

    Rent per unit=kes 10,000
    Rent for 40 units per year=kes 10,000 x 40 units x 12 months=kes 4.8m
    Return on Investment=kes28m/4.8m=5.8 years.

    Most real estate projects in Kenya have a return on investment of 15 years. This project returns its investment in a record 5.8 years hence very feasible.

    Francis Gichuhi kamau, Architect.
    0721410684

  • Terrorism in Malls. How to use architecture to prevent attacks.

    Terrorism in Malls. How to use architecture to prevent attacks.
    Kenya witnessed a very destructive terror attack on Westgate shopping Mall in Nairobi, Westlands area.

    The terrorists struck on Saturday 12pm and held siege till Wednesday morning.

    Westgate mall is designed such that there is a void in the middle where stairs and lifts to the upper and lower basement floors are located.

    This design enabled terrorists to carry out the attack without hindrance.

    The mall has a fort like design where access form outside is limited to the main entrance or the top floor car park.

    Crime prevention.

    My final year Architecture school, University of Nairobi thesis was modelled around Architect Oscar Newman and his concept/theory of Defensible Space.

    http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/crimtheory/newman.htm

    Among the architectural design concepts that can reduce the chances of crime is openness.

    Buildings, including shopping malls can be designed such that the circulation space, corridors, walkways and stair ways are all visible from the main road.

    This visibility makes it harder for criminals to plan and execute their acts since chances are that the public will get prior warning and in case of actual assault, the public can easily gain access into the building.

    Nakumatt Prestige, along Ngong road, comes close to having this open design.

    Nakumatt junction also has the claustrophobic design similar to Westgate. There is only one entrance and circulation space is mostly in the middle.

    Notice the central circulation space.

    Nakumatt crossorads at Karen has several entrances on the ground floor and has accessible windows in case of a terrorist attack.

    Nakumatt Galleria, in Karen, has the best example of external circulation which is safer in case of a terrorist attack.

    In Galleria, its virtually impossible to hold the place hostage since access and visibility is not hampered in any way.

    Way forward.

    The current malls and public buildings will need to be redesigned to enable safety and security in the wake of terrorist attacks.

    Alot of design work input will need to be done so as to remove the central circulation and move it to the outside. Inclusion of large windows and balconies, in the case of Westgate, will go a long way in ensuring safety to the occupants.

    Taj Mahal Hotel, Mumbai.
    In 2008, Taj Mahal in Mumbai was invaded by terrorists who held people hostage for 4 days.

    The design of the Taj Mahal hotel also is fort like and has central circulation. Its very hard for people outside to see the interior. Such designs make it possible for terroists to hold people hostage for a long period of time.

    Moscow theatre. October 2002.

    A cimena theatre was taken hostage in Moscow . It took 3 days to resuce the occupants whereby eventually Russian special forces used sleeping gas to save the situation.

    Again we can see the architectural design of the building has a centralised circulation with one entrance. This design makes it easy for crime to be committed.

    Open architectural design not only works against terror attacks but is also effective on small time common burglary type of crime.
    Inclusion of all the techniques as explained by Architect Oscar Newman in his theory of Defensible space will go a long way in inhibiting chances of terror attacks .
    Use of mart IT technology e.g smart glass that can turn from transparent to opaque at the touch of a button can be used to create levels of openness/privacy in buildings. Buildings that require much privacy eg hotels and hospitals can use smart glass to effect the level of privacy desired per room.

    Francis Gichuhi Kamau, Architect.

    0721410684

  • Terrorism in Malls. How to use architecture to prevent attacks.

    Terrorism in Malls. How to use architecture to prevent attacks.
    Kenya witnessed a very destructive terror attack on Westgate shopping Mall in Nairobi, Westlands area.

    The terrorists struck on Saturday 12pm and held siege till Wednesday morning.

    Westgate mall is designed such that there is a void in the middle where stairs and lifts to the upper and lower basement floors are located.

    This design enabled terrorists to carry out the attack without hindrance.

    The mall has a fort like design where access form outside is limited to the main entrance or the top floor car park.

    Crime prevention.

    My final year Architecture school, University of Nairobi thesis was modelled around Architect Oscar Newman and his concept/theory of Defensible Space.

    http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/crimtheory/newman.htm

    Among the architectural design concepts that can reduce the chances of crime is openness.

    Buildings, including shopping malls can be designed such that the circulation space, corridors, walkways and stair ways are all visible from the main road.

    This visibility makes it harder for criminals to plan and execute their acts since chances are that the public will get prior warning and in case of actual assault, the public can easily gain access into the building.

    Nakumatt Prestige, along Ngong road, comes close to having this open design.

    Nakumatt junction also has the claustrophobic design similar to Westgate. There is only one entrance and circulation space is mostly in the middle.

    Notice the central circulation space.

    Nakumatt crossorads at Karen has several entrances on the ground floor and has accessible windows in case of a terrorist attack.

    Nakumatt Galleria, in Karen, has the best example of external circulation which is safer in case of a terrorist attack.

    In Galleria, its virtually impossible to hold the place hostage since access and visibility is not hampered in any way.

    Way forward.

    The current malls and public buildings will need to be redesigned to enable safety and security in the wake of terrorist attacks.

    Alot of design work input will need to be done so as to remove the central circulation and move it to the outside. Inclusion of large windows and balconies, in the case of Westgate, will go a long way in ensuring safety to the occupants.

    Taj Mahal Hotel, Mumbai.
    In 2008, Taj Mahal in Mumbai was invaded by terrorists who held people hostage for 4 days.

    The design of the Taj Mahal hotel also is fort like and has central circulation. Its very hard for people outside to see the interior. Such designs make it possible for terroists to hold people hostage for a long period of time.

    Moscow theatre. October 2002.

    A cimena theatre was taken hostage in Moscow . It took 3 days to resuce the occupants whereby eventually Russian special forces used sleeping gas to save the situation.

    Again we can see the architectural design of the building has a centralised circulation with one entrance. This design makes it easy for crime to be committed.

    Open architectural design not only works against terror attacks but is also effective on small time common burglary type of crime.
    Inclusion of all the techniques as explained by Architect Oscar Newman in his theory of Defensible space will go a long way in inhibiting chances of terror attacks .
    Use of mart IT technology e.g smart glass that can turn from transparent to opaque at the touch of a button can be used to create levels of openness/privacy in buildings. Buildings that require much privacy eg hotels and hospitals can use smart glass to effect the level of privacy desired per room.

    Francis Gichuhi Kamau, Architect.
    mrndunguf@yahoo.co.uk
    0721410684

  • Iron sheet housing on a 50 x 100 ft plot.

    Iron sheet housing costs in Kenya.
    Assuming the cost per m2 for iron sheet housing is kes 6,000 per m2, a 50 x 100 ft plot construction will cost as below.

    Design type.
    2 rooms with outside sharing toilet and bathrooms.
    Each room is 12m2.
    Total area for 2 rooms =24m2.
    Number of rooms in the 50 x 100 ft plot=14

    Total floor area =14 rooms x 24m2=336m2.

    Cost per house with 2 rooms=kes 6,000 x 24m2=kes 144,000

    Cost per unit .
    Walling iron sheets=70m2
    cost per m2 of walling iron sheets including timber frame and labour=kes600
    Cost of walling=kes 600 x 70m2=kes 42,000

    Cost of roof.
    Area of roof =30m2
    cost of roofinng sheet inclisive of timber framing and labour=kes600 per m2.
    Roof cost =kes 600 x 30m2=kes 18000

    Cost of floor slab and foundation.
    Assuming kes 3,000 per m2
    =30m2 x 2000=kes 60,000

    Cost of 2 windows= kes 15,000
    Cost of 2 doors inclusive frame=kes 10,000

    Total cost =kes 145,000

    Cost per m2=145,000/24=kes 6,000

    Total cost of 14 units= 14 units x kes 144,000=kes 2,016,000.

    Return on Investment.
    Average rent = kes 3,000 per house.
    Monthly rent for 14 houses=kes 42,000

    Yearly rent=kes 504, 000

    R.O.I= 4 YEARS.

    Within 4 years, the cost of construction will have paid back.

    Disadvantages.

    Maintenance cost is high.
    Risk of parts of the building iron sheets being stolen.
    High tenant move out due to poor insulation . Too cold at night and too hot during the day.
    Poor sound proofing from one house to the other.

    Advantages.
    Takes short time to construct.
    Takes low capital to complete.

    Francis Gichuhi Kamau, Architect.

  • Futuristic designs.

    Futuristic designs.
    Judging from the design change in phones and computers, building designs should also take cue .
    The Android phone has overtaken Symbian operating system due to its vast capabilities of change due to the numerous Apps.
    Android apps are now close to 1 million in number.
    The recent slowdown in Nokia sales can be attributed to their use of the more rigid Symbian operating system that does not give uses the much needed adaptability.
    Content management systems such as wordpress also are last growing compared to their competitors e.g. drupal due to their large app/plug in depository.
    Therefore, judging from this trend, the more apps/plugin there are, the more customers there will be.

    Architecture.

    Current building construction technology is quite rigid. Once a house is built, its not easy to change the room sizes, door sizes, window sizes, roof shape etc.
    Over the years, architects will have to design buildings that give the users more options.

    Door/Windows.

    With the smart glass technology, it’s now possible for users to change the opaque/transparentness of glass just by the tough of a button. This option can be included in smart house design.

    Roof.

    Roof angle can be designed such that at the touch of a button, the roof can change to flat roof, ensuring and creating a roof top balcony.
    Such retractable surfaces can also be used to cover swimming pools so that the swimming pool surface can be used as solid ground at the touch of a button.

    Rooms.

    Two rooms can be easily joined together/separated by the touch of a button whereby the separating wall turns and folds into wall cabinets.
    Balconies can be designed to easily change into solid wall facades if the house users require this, all by the touch of a button.

    http://www.houzz.com/retractable-walls

    Furniture can also be retractable into walls at the touch of a button.

    Building facades.

    Building facades can be designed to be easily changed just as mobile phone faces. This can be at the touch of a button. Textures that are respondent to change of color at the touch of a button can be used for the external surfaces. Currently, we have luxury range of cars that can easily change exterior color.
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/9176679/Peugeot-paint-changes-colour-with-your-mood.html

    http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2009-06/magnetochromatic-material-changes-color-command

    Conclusion.

    The more adaptability features the future smart house will have, the more will be its demand. Entrepreneurs will innovate custom made adaptability features e.g. exterior paints, swimming pools, glass, roofs and furniture so as to meet demand.

    Francis Gichuhi Kamau, Architect.
    0721410684
    gichuhi

  • Hidden Secret Rooms within Houses and Offices.

    Hidden Secret Rooms within Houses and Offices.

    Hidden secret rooms within residential houses and offices are important in aiding for the security of the occupants. These are also useful as security during unfavorable weather e.g. hurricanes, tornadoes or security in case of fire outbreak.
    Offices.
    Spaces can be created within the office and camouflaged by a book shelf or office cabinet
    This can be a useful place to keep private belongings such as guns, cash and other sensitive documents. Also, in case of an intruder, it can also be a safe haven for the occupant. In the recent situation regarding Nairobi Governor, if his office had such a secret room, this would have saved him from having to deal with issues as they panned out.
    Redidential Houses.
    Hidden secret rooms can be strategically located in most rooms within the house. If cost is an issue, the rooms can be located in a select few rooms.
    These rooms can be used as children playing rooms or safes.
    Fire proofing.
    Secret rooms need to be fire proofed in case the house catches fire. Locating such rooms with direct access to external natural ventilation and encased in fireproof material is necessary.
    The door can be similar to the bank vault doors which give at least 4 hours of fire safety.
    The fire resistant doors should also restrict passage of smoke into the secret rooms.
    Normal doors can be converted into 20/30 min fire resistant doors through addition of fireskins stuck on the door. The fireskins can be stuck on one or both sides.
    Locating secret rooms underground, in the basement, safely assures protection from fire/heat.
    Poisonous gas.
    The secret rooms should also be naturally ventilated in case of poisonous gas fumes from fire or any other source. Use of a camouflaged chimney incorporated into the design can assist in allowing natural light and ventilation especially for underground secret rooms.
    Gazebos.
    Underground secret rooms can also be designed to exit outside into a Gazebo through a tunnel.
    Smart Houses.
    With this era of smart buildings, IT features can be incorporated into these secret rooms to aid occupants in opening entry/exit doors, communicating, setting alarm on/off and video/audio viewing/recording of activities within the house.
    Insecurity can no longer be a reason for people not to live in certain places if such design interventions can be put in place.
    Many a family has been traumatized by thugs hours on end in insecure neighborhoods. With use of early warning alarm systems, occupants can have a relaxed living knowing that they are safe.
    Francis Gichuhi Kamau, Architect.

  • Kinoo, Kikuyu Seeking Joint Venture for development of apartments.

    Cost Item

    Kshs

    %

    Land

    32,000,000.00

    12.74595714

    Preliminary

    1,260,000.00

    0.501872062

    Construction

    140,000,000.00

    55.7635625

    External Works

    7,000,000.00

    2.788178125

    Contingency

    2,800,000.00

    1.11527125

    Architectural fees

    8,400,000.00

    3.34581375

    Quantity Surveying

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Structural Engineering

    2,800,000.00

    1.11527125

    Elec/Mech Engineering

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Interior Design/Landscaping

    700,000.00

    0.278817812

    Legal fees

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Project Management fees

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Marketing

    8,500,000.00

    3.385644866

    Financial Charges

    42,000,000.00

    16.72906875

    Total

    251,060,000.00

    100

     

    Google map url here
    https://maps.google.co.ke/maps?saddr=Unknown+road&daddr=City+Square,+Nairobi&hl=en&sll=-1.258375,36.696315&sspn=0.012164,0.021136&geocode=FbjL7P8dAPQvAg%3BFSdf7P8dBe0xAinbJd_OJxEvGDHQ2to-Zo8FMA&oq=city&t=h&gl=ke&mra=ls&z=13

  • Kinoo, Kikuyu Seeking Joint Venture for development of apartments.

    Cost Item

    Kshs

    %

    Land

    32,000,000.00

    12.74595714

    Preliminary

    1,260,000.00

    0.501872062

    Construction

    140,000,000.00

    55.7635625

    External Works

    7,000,000.00

    2.788178125

    Contingency

    2,800,000.00

    1.11527125

    Architectural fees

    8,400,000.00

    3.34581375

    Quantity Surveying

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Structural Engineering

    2,800,000.00

    1.11527125

    Elec/Mech Engineering

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Interior Design/Landscaping

    700,000.00

    0.278817812

    Legal fees

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Project Management fees

    1,400,000.00

    0.557635625

    Marketing

    8,500,000.00

    3.385644866

    Financial Charges

    42,000,000.00

    16.72906875

    Total

    251,060,000.00

    100

     

    Google map url here
    https://maps.google.co.ke/maps?saddr=Unknown+road&daddr=City+Square,+Nairobi&hl=en&sll=-1.258375,36.696315&sspn=0.012164,0.021136&geocode=FbjL7P8dAPQvAg%3BFSdf7P8dBe0xAinbJd_OJxEvGDHQ2to-Zo8FMA&oq=city&t=h&gl=ke&mra=ls&z=13

  • Poisonous Lead paints usage in Kenya.

    Lead paints.
    According to research done by Cecilia Nganga here http://ipen.org/iccm3/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Lead-in-Kenyan-Household-Paint.pdf
    Kenyan paint contains Lead 165 times higher than acceptable standards by the USA health department.
    In USA, Lead is banned to be used in paint. This is because of the health hazards it posses to humans.

    Kenyan Law.
    In Kenya, there is no law regulating use of Lead in paint. Kenya Bureau of Standards does not enforece any standards regarding Lead use in paint. This leaves Kenyans susseptible to Lead poisoning.

    Architectural solution.
    Architects can specify non Lead based paints or use natural textures instead of paint eg dressed stone.

    Need for law to regulate use of Lead in Paint.
    Kenyan parliament needs a law to regulate and criminalise use of Lead in paint, similar to the USA. USA passed such laws in 1978.

    Francis Gichuhi Kamau,Architect.